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‘Out of the Shadow of Brisbane’: CBD Development and Local Identity 
 
Laurence Johnson 
 
The story of the shopping centre and CBD redevelopment in the regional Queensland city of 
Ipswich provides a cautionary tale for local politicians and regional civic developers. Indeed, 
the fact that this history is so bound up in ‘stories’ is a key part of the lessons to be learned. 
The Ipswich Centre Shopping Plaza was used as a key reference point for the creation of 
myths shaping a particular ‘Ipswich’ identity in local discourses such as newspaper reports, 
planning policy documents and promotional material. These discourses suggest that lessons 
from the decline of a retail complex may not merely relate to recognising failures in spatial 
planning or strict economics. The lessons may also relate to how we talk about the built 
environment and how this impacts on the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, that is, 
how we fashion our own sense of cultural identity.  
 
Why should so much of our sense of a local cultural identity hinge on a shopping centre? The 
answer is, of course, that it does not. The shopping centre is, in a sense, expedient. A general 
feature of any discourse is its fluidity, yet discourses propagating myths of identity attempt to 
fix upon a basic set of relatively stable points of reference. National identities revolve around 
simplistic shared concepts such as mateship, Manifest Destiny, or Volk. At the local level, the 
development of the built environment goes hand in hand with identity formation, and identity 
can often be linked to monolithic landmarks as stable, unshifting reference points. Stability in 
a landmark is reliant, however, on the discourse that attributes to it its significance. I used to 
wonder at a sign by the road that winds through Cunningham’s Gap. The sign reads ‘Historic 
Site: 400 metres’ and, sure enough, as you round a bend 400 metres away, you encounter yet 
another sign on a tree reading ‘Historic Site.’ Not having anywhere on the tight road to stop 
and discern what sets this tree or its location apart from the thousands of trees surrounding it, 
one has to take the sign’s word for it. 
 
The distinction between a landmark and just any old lump of rock is thus a tenuous one. What 
gives to the landmark its relative stability as a point of reference is not its physical structure or 
location; rather, it is the discourse itself. To make this point clearer, I will refer to what Rob 
Shields in Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity (1991) described as a 
distinction between ‘space’ and ‘place.’ Space is the relative locations of things, divisions of 
land, paths between locations and such. ‘Placeness’ involves attributing to local sites ‘central 
social myths which underwrite ideological divisions’ (47) thus producing a formation that is 
‘half topology, half metaphor … an emotive ordering or coded geography’ (265). Landmark 
status given to locations, sites or structures is fundamental to the process of transforming mere 
space into place. Landmarks carve the otherwise slippery ‘place’ codes in stone. 
 
The story of the Ipswich Centre Plaza is a history of the attempts by the locals to define the 
coded geography of Ipswich. An early contender for the capital of Queensland, Ipswich has 
long since struggled to overcome the fact of its proximity to that other city which was given 
the title. In 1967, the Ipswich City Council proposed that all future planning should revolve 
around a coherent broad-based scheme designed to promote development across the whole 
of the city. By 1971, a Town Planning Branch had been formed with the explicit purpose of 
drafting such a plan, and by 1976 the resulting policy plan had been formally gazetted. Key 
elements of the plan had been in currency for up to twelve months prior to this in the form 
of Council development submissions and elements of the plan had been incorporated in the 
Council’s Statement of Policy 1975-1985. The policy opens with a clear statement of what 
is needed for Ipswich to grow in line with the vision of 1967: 
 
The relation and increasing importance of Ipswich City to the Moreton Region 
becomes apparent when it is realised that ...the Ipswich City Centre is located 
within a radius of 30 kilometres from the Brisbane City Centre. 
 
This one factor together with the potentially ideal communications link that 
already exists between the two cities, indicates that Ipswich must grow and 
strengthen, not as a suburb of Brisbane, but as an individual City, with its own 
identity and characteristics. (8) 
 
Plans for the development of the city are tied directly here to identity formation, cast here in 
opposition to the burgeoning Brisbane. As the Statement of Policy unfolds its vision for the 
future, it becomes apparent that Ipswich is seen as having been threatened with an ancillary 
status because of the drawing power of Brisbane’s commercial centres. Accordingly, major 
developments are planned to improve the retail options for shoppers throughout the service 
area overseen by the council. Commercial centres are planned for development at several 
‘strategic locations’ (13), the current sites of Booval Fair, a shopping complex in Bundamba, 
Redbank Plaza, Redbank Plains Shopping Village, and the St.Ives complex in Goodna. 
 
The location of these developments is strategically calculated to promote the emergence of a 
number of ‘commercial nodes’ (13-14) to halt leakage of trade to Brisbane. The use of this 
term ‘node’ suggests that the plan was drafted according to the principles of the ‘node-path’ 
paradigm popular at the time in town planning theory. As Eugene Franckowiak explains in 
Location Perception and the Hierarchical Structure of Retail Centres (1978), commuters or 
pedestrians make decisions about directional travel based on cognitive maps, in which core 
associations are made between ‘nodes’ (landmarks, buildings, centres) and ‘paths’ (major 
arterials, connector roads, railways). Franckowiak’s extensive study combined psychology 
with geography to investigate the orientational influence of arterials, shopping centres, and 
the CBD on shopper location choices. The goal of the planned developments from Booval 
to Goodna is clear: provide enough commercial ‘nodes’ accessible by prominent ‘paths’ to 
render Brisbane redundant as a shopper location choice for residents of Ipswich suburbs. 
 
Yet over and above the development of these strategic commercial nodes, the Statement of 
Policy outlined as a priority a series of steps planned to ‘provide a City Centre that will work 
efficiently, be a delight to those who use it, and which will be equipped to draw trade from the 
entirity (sic) of its service area’ (17). An appended report entitled ‘Ipswich Plaza’ outlined in 
more detail the need for the proposed steps to proceed as follows: 
 
1. Construction of an office complex on Bell Street; 
2. Upgrading of the railway station opposite the office complex; 
3. Construction of a modern shopping plaza over the railway station; 
4. Electrification of the rail service; 
5. Development of a pedestrian mall. 
 
The Statement of Policy stresses the importance of coordinating the various improvements, 
and concludes that ‘the upgrading of the railway would not have the same result for Ipswich 
without the improved City centre shopping and office facilities’ (22-23).  
 
That the railway should be considered important to the proposed redevelopment is significant. 
Ipswich Station was, until 1993, the terminal site on one branch of the Brisbane Metropolitan 
Railway network. It is difficult to think of any other fact that could have contributed more to a 
perception that Ipswich was an outpost of the greater Brisbane metropolis. According to node-
path reasoning, the rail link also provides the greatest threat to local trade, since the dominant 
commercial node (Brisbane CBD) is located directly at the core of the transit system (Central 
Station). More important than establishing a sprinkling of viable commercial nodes along the 
major arterials between Ipswich and Brisbane, then, the priority in halting leakage of trade to 
Brisbane is to plug the leak at its source. Establishing a viable CBD around the railway station 
is thus intended to dissuade Ipswich residents from commuting to Brisbane, and should draw 
shoppers from along the Ipswich rail line toward a different ‘central’ station. 
 
The priority given to the railway development (and, we may assume, to the order of steps for 
proposed CBD development) was demonstrated in March 1976 with Council announcing that 
plans for the development of the Nicholas Street Mall were to be deferred to avoid restricting 
access to the Cribb & Foote car park, required during the redevelopment of the railway station 
(‘Mall Scheme …’ 7). The new station and adjoining SGIO (State Government Insurance 
Office) complex were made operational in July and August of 1978. The line at this stage had 
yet to be converted for electrification, a process that would not be completed until 1980. Still, 
after just two steps of the proposed development  editorial commentaries in local newspapers 
and business outlook reports in the City yearbook listed the new developments as significant 
contributions to a local building revival in 1978.  
 
At this stage, the Ipswich Plaza remained an empty two-level shell awaiting finalisation of the 
letting arrangements. According to a press release by the Ipswich Chamber of Commerce, the 
letting did not pan out as confidently as expected. The statement, released less than a week 
before opening, it was revealed that ‘too many loose ends in the letting details’ had mitigated 
against involvement by local businesses and threatened the continued viability of the project 
(‘Centre Loses Its Friends!’ 9). Despite these initial problems, 23 leases were secured in time 
for the opening of Stage One (the main complex on top of the railway station) on 28 
November 1978, in time for peak Christmas shopping. 
 
As if to combat the doomsayers from the Chamber of Commerce, the Council gave extensive 
promotional exposure to the opening in the Queensland Times, with full-page advertisements 
appearing regularly and finally a full 16-page feature included on the day. Although planned 
under the name of ‘Ipswich Plaza,’ the complex had been given the name ‘Ipswich Centre’ 
prior to opening, which seems consistent with the commercial node-path logic that had been 
employed in the initial proposal. Nearby Redbank would have its own ‘plaza’ but the CBD 
complex in Ipswich was to be the ‘centre.’ Items in the Ipswich Centre Opening Feature 
emphasised local businesses and personalities, and ensured local readers that, during 
construction of the centre,  
 
Maximum usage was made at all times of Ipswich components, manpower, 
and facilities, e.g. all the concrete was supplied locally. More than 200 men, 
including builders, labourers, and so on, have been engaged on the project. 
Most of them have been from the local area. (‘Building the Complex Wasn’t 
Easy!’ 9)   
 
The promotional feature is an explicit effort at ‘placing’ the complex as central to the local 
area and this claim that construction was supported by local labour and materials intersects 
with existing local myths to propagate this sense of a place. Even as it promotes the centre 
as an important commercial site, this claim also ties in with the image of the Ipswich local 
as a labourer. Significantly, this image supports the ‘placing’ of the centre by generating the 
idea that the site is a concrete product of the local labour force, rather than merely being a 
site for consumption. 
 
I have noted that the development of the mall was being held over until after completion of 
the first four steps outlined in the CBD development proposal. The Ipswich Centre was built 
in two stages: the first was above the redeveloped railway station; the second was opposite 
Stage One, on the other side of Bell Street. An item in the Ipswich Centre Opening Feature 
foreshadowed the completion of Stage Two in short time, informing readers that it was due 
to open ‘late February, 1979 (in time for Easter) increasing the number of retail outlets to 
around 50’ (‘Stage One Opens Today 10). In view of the letting problems that had troubled 
Stage One, the confidence exuded by this claim is worth noting, and is a sign of the 
Council’s desire to present a positive spin on the harsh realities projected by the Chamber of 
Commerce in the days leading up to the opening of Stage One. 
 
If the letting problems of Stage One had seemed to have been overcome by the eleventh 
hour efforts of the letting authority, these same problems were inherited by the Stage Two 
development. When the complex finally opened on 23 April 1979—two months late—nine 
vacancies remained to be filled in Stage Two (‘Retail Trade Is Growing’ 31) and two of the 
stores in Stage One complex had already closed. Redoubled efforts by letting authorities 
saw all but one vacancy filled within a year, although there was a regular turnover in leases 
throughout the complex over the next decade. Although no authoritative figures on leases 
has been acquired, my abiding memory of the centre in these years is that the majority of 
outlets closed within two or three years of taking on a lease. Nevertheless, most leases were 
usually filled at any given time for much of the 1980s. When the end came, it was relatively 
swift. 
 
This brings me to consider the impact of the mall development, the fifth step in the Council’s 
overall plan for developing a CBD capable of supporting a specifically local identity, apart 
from the nearby spectre of the Brisbane CBD. Development of a mall had been touted for a 
number of years prior to the release of the Statement of Policy in 1976, with the most likely 
candidates being Bell and Nicholas Streets, flanking the Cribb & Foote department store. In 
the plan set out by Council in 1976, the mall development was to be held over until all four 
prior developments had been completed. By 1980, these steps had been completed, but the 
mall development remained stalled until at least 1982. It was in this year that the Brisbane  
City Council announced plans for the closure of Queen Street.  
 
In the same year, Bernard Clark carried out a ‘policy delphi’ survey of Ipswich residents, in 
which he asked locals to rate the importance or priority of a variety of Town Planning policy 
directives. Most directives were taken from the Council’s planning documents from the past 
decade, although several additional items were included by the compiler in an effort to gauge 
public concern in areas not already covered by Council policy. The final results show a strong 
level of public agreement with the priorities established in the policy plan of 1976. The three 
highest priorities identified by Ipswich residents were: 
 
l. Create a Pedestrian Mall; 
2. Attract Commercial Development;  
3. Revitalise the CBD. (Clark 152) 
 
Beyond simple agreement, however, these results suggest a number of issues. First, it should 
be remembered that this survey was conducted after completion of the first four steps of the 
proposed CBD redevelopment, and yet public opinion reflected a continued concern that the 
CBD was in need of revitalisation. Also, it is worth noting that the survey was conducted in 
four rounds, with the results being compiled in aggregate after each round and then averaged 
out against the figures produced in previous rounds. The directive to create a pedestrian mall 
ranked much lower in the first round of results and Clark notes that the sharp rise in interest 
for the mall development coincides with the announcement of the decision to proceed with 
construction of the Brisbane mall (152). This sudden rise in public concern about the lack of a 
pedestrian mall suggests, therefore, that Ipswich residents were not concerned so much with 
the Council proposals of 1976 as they were with the fact that Brisbane was about to beat them 
to the punch on yet another thing. In this regard, local public opinion reflected the spirit of the 
Statement of Policy if not its actual content. 
 
Despite the renewed urgency over the mall proposal, organisational and economic problems 
slowed efforts to proceed with the closure of Nicholas Street for another three years. Then, in 
1985, the Kern Corporation approached council with a proposal for the redevelopment of the 
City Centre, with plans to further upgrade the existing redevelopments and proceed with the 
construction of a mall. On 22 May 1985, Mayor Des Freedman announced immediate action 
toward the redevelopment would be authorised to proceed without an economic impact study 
(Toon 3). This announcement flew in the face of State Government legislation that had been 
put into effect five years earlier. At that time, Brisbane City Council policy had operated in 
favour of widespread unimpeded shopping centre development, on the basis that Council 
policy could ‘not be used to protect the income or standard of living of shopkeepers’ against 
development (Brisbane City Council Policy Statement 2.1.1 cited in Kiel and Wadley 5). 
Responding to complaints by members of the food retailing industry over saturation of the 
market by shopping centres, the State Government produced four amended Acts governing 
development of shopping centres: the City of Brisbane Town Planning Act 1964-80, the City 
of Brisbane Act 1924-80, the Local Government Act 1936-80, and the Valuation of Land Act 
1944-80. All of these Acts stated that no new development could proceed without provision of 
a detailed economic impact assessment. 
 
It is possible that the decision to bypass legislated requirements was made on the basis of an 
assumption that the legislation had been formulated in response to complaints by retailers in 
the Brisbane CBD alone. Yet I suspect the decision to override legislation was based on the 
suggestion that it only applied to ‘new’ developments. While Kern Corporation’s proposal 
was a new one, Ipswich City Council may have reckoned that the proposal merely extended 
the plans they had already been implementing since 1976. In any case, progress on the mall 
development continued to be hampered by a variety of problems. Most significant of these 
problems was the blaze which destroyed the Reids department store (formerly the Cribb & 
Foote store) on the night of 18 April 1985. This building had been an integral component in 
the Kern Corporation’s plans and the damage led to a major delay.  
 
Throughout this delay, the Ipswich CBD underwent a period of decline. Once again, it was 
the Chamber of Commerce, in conjunction with Ipswich Central City Traders’, who stated 
the obvious (Graham 1). According to these reports, costs for the Kern proposal had 
escalated from $85 million to around $140 million, the Corporation delayed submission to 
Council of a formal application or any firm plans, and more than 25 central city businesses 
had closed since the Reids fire (some of them evicted after Kern purchased the site). Yet it 
would seem that too much had been invested by Council (both financially and conceptually) 
in the prospect of a mall development to force a strategic withdrawal. I suggest that instead 
of staying true to the original Statement of Policy, however, renewed efforts to promote the 
mall undermined the existing developments. 
 
How did this happen? First, we can note that the Kern Corporation proposal was taken on 
board as a CBD redevelopment plan revolving around the development of an ‘Ipswich City 
Square’ on the shell of the old Reids store. The Stage One complex operating as the Ipswich 
Centre was renamed the ‘Ipswich Centre Plaza,’ a name that no longer suggested this site 
represented the centre. Instead, the Stage One complex was now merely a component of the 
centre, and a peripheral one at that, since it was now across the road from the main focus of 
activity. Indeed, this very phrase, had been used in the Ipswich Centre Opening Feature as a 
description for the central stairwell in the Stage One complex, and it was now adopted in the 
promotional materials used for the mall—for example, in an Ipswich/West Moreton Touring 
Guide circulated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, an item is entitled ‘Mall is the Focus of 
Activity’).  
 
Other promotional materials for the new development used ideas that had previously been 
used to promote the Stage One and Stage Two developments of the Ipswich Centre Plaza, 
concepts such as modernity, style, and facility. These are the sorts of concepts commonly 
associated with shopping centre developments and which, as Meaghan Morris notes, are 
‘layout and design principles [that] ensure that all centres are minally readable to anyone 
literate in their use’ (‘Things to do …’ 194). In other words, we expect shopping centres or 
malls to be promoted in terms of their modernity, style, and facility. Where I think the 
promotions for the new Ipswich City Square and mall development become a little insidious 
is in the fact that they do not at the same time iterate the association of these concepts with 
the existing complex. 
 
What I am suggesting, then, is that in circulating a discourse intended to promote the new 
development, the Council (perhaps unwittingly) had leeched the associations formerly used 
for the Ipswich Centre. As a result, the way in which locals would have previously ‘placed’ 
the Ipswich Centre as a fundamental CBD landmark was now the way in which they placed 
the Ipswich City Square and the mall development as its replacement, not its complement. 
To compound the situation, an additional set of associations began to circulate at this time, 
providing extra weight to the notion that the new CBD developments fitted more neatly into 
local myths of identity than had its predecessor. 
 
When the mall development was still in its planning phase, the question of the ‘historicity’ 
of the site became a regular issue in discussions and promotions. For example, the Ipswich 
City Council published a photograph taken in 1917 to make comparisons with the current 
landscape, supposedly enabling the ‘council planners to judge the historical significance of 
several landmarks in the area’ (‘Old Photograph …’ 3). Further, chief town planner John 
Brannock told the press that this photograph ‘was a boost for the council in its attempts to 
retain the identity of the street.’ The appeals to historicity as a key marker of ‘identity’ 
enable the mall to be associated with the one concept which, at the time, was on the verge of 
being ‘discovered’ as the defining identity marker of the Ipswich region: its heritage.  
 
While it is difficult in retrospect to pinpoint the exact moment when somebody first got the 
idea to identify Ipswich with its heritage, I suspect that the mall development was a pivotal 
moment in the history of this association. Certainly, in the early 1990s, the term ‘heritage’ 
begins to appear in numerous places in association with the city, and the phrase ‘Heritage 
City’ has subsequently been adopted as a promotional name for the region. In 1991, there 
were efforts to revive the city’s annual festival which had for decades been failing to draw 
crowds or trade, and this failure was often attributed to the inability of festival organisers to 
pinpoint the ‘true’ identity of the locale. As a promotional item for the 1991 festival notes, 
‘Ipswich has an identity problem because the city has a festival problem’ (‘A City With A 
Festival Problem’ 15). To resolve this problem, festival organisers arranged for their event to 
coincide with Queensland Heritage Week, labelling the local festival ‘Heritage Funfest.’ The 
promoters bragged that ‘this year's festival may have found the town’s true identity on which 
it can build future festivals, future tourism, future individual glory, out of the shadow of 
Brisbane—its heritage’ (15). 
 
Here the old bugbear of Brisbane rears its head once more, but the tone is decidedly more 
optimistic than the Council had been in the Statement of Policy some 15 years earlier. In the 
notion of ‘heritage,’ the festival promoters believed they had uncovered a distinct marker of 
local identity that could be used not only to focus on past glories—after all, the city had once 
upon a time challenged Brisbane for the capital of Queensland—but also to provide a focus 
for future opportunities in tourism and entertainment. The festival proved to be a success and 
this may have been the catalyst for the Council to adopt the term in just about every possible 
forum during the next year. As examples, the Heritage Funfest was retained during the early 
1990s, ‘Heritage Property Incentives’ were established, ‘Heritage Walks’ became available as 
a tourist attraction, a ‘Heritage Hotline’ was set up for locals, and ‘Heritage City Living’ 
notices started appearing weekly in the Queensland Times.  
 
Yet, as I have suggested, the Council may have already stumbled on the idea of using the past 
as a positive identity marker when they began promoting the mall development site in terms 
of its historicity. When the mall was opened in 1988, the site was marked by an obelisk at the 
Brisbane Street end. This obelisk had been sculpted by Tom Farrell specifically to function as 
a ‘historic’ landmark, engraved with images of local events and industries of the past. When 
the Ipswich/West Moreton Touring Guide was put into circulation soon afterwards, the mall 
was listed as a ‘focus of activity,’ as we have seen, but the obelisk was listed also under a 
separate entry in an item entitled ‘History is Everywhere.’ The item lists mostly buildings 
and sites developed in the Nineteenth Century, yet the obelisk is listed because it ‘shows 
scenes and industries important to Ipswich, from the earliest days to the present.’  
 
The earliest days to the present—the obelisk functions, then, not only as a physical marker in 
‘space’ but as a pivot for the intersection of heritage and modernity in ‘place,’ a connection 
that had been lacking in earlier attempts to promote the Ipswich Centre development. This, I 
suggest, was a precipitating factor in the rapid decline of the Stage One complex. While it is 
certainly true that the number of occupied shop sites in the Stage One complex evaporated at 
the same time that the so-called ‘boom of the 1980s’ came to an end (Condon 29), we should 
not forget that, at the same time, both the mall and the Ipswich City Square sites were well 
supported. Whereas the mall development had initially been conceived as the completion of 
developments beginning with the Ipswich Centre, the two complexes finished up operating as 
direct competitors by the time the Ipswich City Square development was completed.  
 
It is easy to imagine that an economic impact assessment might have identified the problem 
in advance, prompting the Council to make forward thinking decisions about the fate of the 
Ipswich Centre Plaza prior to its decline. As I have suggested, however, there remained a 
significant conceptual investment in the Statement of Policy, its ten year plan, and the node-
path paradigm on which the plan was based. The decision to hand the Stage One complex to 
the West Moreton Regional Health Authority in 1992 marked the end of this investment. In 
the 1990s, as we have seen, the spirt of the Statement of Policy was well and truly replaced 
by the new found myth of identity built around the notion of ‘heritage.’ 
 
Yet the Ipswich City Council has wisely resisted resting on its laurels on the success of this 
heritage mania. The latests Statement of Proposals demonstrates that the lessons of the past 
have also been learned. Of course, the latest proposals make no explicit mention of the 1976 
planning document, but the relevant sections of the Statement of Proposals on development 
in urban areas in the key elements of ‘Business and Industry Land’ and ‘Centres’ contain a 
good many indirect references to the earlier plans and their limitations.  
 
The lesson here is significant. Ipswich needs to be different from Brisbane, but this need not 
extend to ignoring fundamental government planning practices that just happen to have been 
legislated with Brisbane in mind. Indeed, nowhere in the Statement of Proposals is any use 
made of reference to Brisbane at all. There is no better way to come out from the shadow of 
Brisbane than to cast the light entirely on Ipswich itself. The blindspot covering Brisbane in 
this document even extends to a refusal to consider the proximity of the Brisbane CBD as a 
threat to local business. Instead, the new plans commit to ensuring that the existing centres 
at Booval, Redbank, and so on, be maintained only in so far as they accommodate the ‘main 
service and comparison shopping needs of designated population catchments’ (9) and that a 
series of new centres and neighbourhood complexes will be developed to service the growth 
areas across the region. These centres will be encouraged to generally provide only ‘lower 
order professional office, business, financial and personal services with entertainment and 
recreation functions being of a local nature’ (10).  
 
For all major services and entertainment and recreation functions, priority remains with the 
Ipswich City CBD, designated in the new document as the ‘Key Regional Centre’ (9). The 
new proposal also specifies that preference should be given to plans aimed at ‘consolidating 
or redeveloping existing centres or developing planned new centres rather than developing 
unplanned new centres’ (11). The Ipswich City Square had not been foreseen in the policy 
plans for 1975-1985, yet this unplanned new centre had been taken on board by council on 
the basis that it had formed a key part of the Kern Corporation’s plans to develop the mall, 
which Council had included as a planned new centre. Lesson learned, it seems. 
 
Finally, the proposal includes one significant statement in regards to any new development, 
planned or unplanned:  
 
Recognise that Centres, and the retail industry in particular, are dynamic in 
nature. Accordingly, the Centres Strategy should be implemented in a flexible 
manner which is able to accommodate innovative and emerging activities 
which are able to demonstrate community benefits. (12) 
 
Flexibility is one quality that had not been inscribed in the policy plans for 1975-1985, and I 
have suggested here that the unbending commitment to implementing a five-step plan which 
culminated in a major new development (a mall) was unwittingly responsible for the failure 
of the Ipswich Centre Plaza. It remains to be seen now whether flexibility in implementation 
of city planning will extend beyond a node-path mode of thinking to cover the fluid ways in 
which myths of identity are negotiated over and above the retail function of these sites.  
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